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Defence  matters.  This  is  the  opening 
sentence (probably the shortest ever) of 
the  conclusions  of  the  December  2013 
European Council. And that matters too. 
It had become quite necessary for the Heads 
of State and Government of the EU to address 
defence. In December 2010 the Foreign and 
Defence  Ministers  launched  “Pooling  and 
Sharing”,  which  initially  created  a  good 
dynamic. That was fizzling out however. Faced 
with  austerity,  many  defence  establishments 
adopted hedgehog formation. Not pooling but 
protecting what means were left them became 
the order of the day. The limited initiatives that 
did  materialize  aimed  mostly  at  maintaining 
what  was  there.  But  in  terms  of  strategic 
enablers,  nothing  much  was  there,  only 
shortfalls – and a shortfall cannot be pooled, 
one  can  only  share  the  frustration.  Alas,  for 
many  Member  States  investing  in  collective 
enablers did not go far beyond investing staff 
hours in project meetings.  
 
1. THE PROCESS IS ON TRACK  
Kicking the issue up to the level of Heads of 
State and Government revitalized the debate. 
The  year  2013  saw  a  flurry  of  activity, 
including  an  extensive  report  by  the  High 
Representative and a communication from the 
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Commission.  Defence  is  now  back  on  the 
agenda and it is there to stay, for the European 
Council “will address concrete progress on all 
issues in June 2015”. The start of a process of 
top-down steering at the highest political level 
(and in the EU, process matters) is Herman 
Van  Rompuy’s  1
st  achievement  in  making 
defence Chefsache.  
 
2. PROGRAMMES HAVE BEEN INITIATED  
This  hectic  debate  has  already  produced 
concrete  results,  thanks  to  the  leadership  of 
individual  Member  States  and  the  European 
Defence  Agency  (EDA).  In  several  of  the 
priority areas, the European Council was able 
to  welcome  multinational  programmes o n  
strategic enablers: drones, air-to-air refuelling, 
satellite  communication  and  cyber  security. 
The substantial increase in European enablers 
that ought to be the result will constitute the 
2
nd achievement of the European Council.  
 
3. THE COMMISSION IS ON BOARD  
In most if not all of these programmes, the 
Commission  will  have  an  important  part  to 
play. The reason is obvious: strategic enablers 
are  mostly  dual-use,  for  they  can  enable 
military  as  well  as  civilian  actions,  and  they 
concern  both  external  and  internal  security. 
That  certainly  applies  to  research,  where  a 
preparatory  action  on  CSDP-related  research 
will  be  set  up  and  funds  can  be  mobilized 
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under  Horizon  2020.  But  Member  States 
should not hesitate to make the most of the 
Commission’s  creative  proposal  to  also 
(co)finance actual dual-use projects. Instead of 
seeing it as Commission intrusion into an area 
that they regard as their chasse gardée, Member 
States should welcome the application of the 
comprehensive  approach  to  capability 
development  as  well,  especially  as  their  own 
investment budgets are shrinking.  
 
At least an important first step has been made 
towards recognizing the civilian-military nature 
of  strategic  enablers,  integrating  the  internal 
and external dimensions (including the CSDP, 
cyber security, energy security, and the area of 
Freedom,  Security  and  Justice)  and, 
consequently,  enhancing  the  role  of  the 
Commission  across  the  spectrum  of  security 
and defence – a 3
rd achievement.  
 
Now  that  some  programmes  on  strategic 
enablers  have  been  initiated,  more  Member 
States should sign up to them and invest, to 
make them economically viable. The first step 
often  is  creating  user  communities  and 
increasing coordination in order to make more 
cost-effective use of existing capacity. That is a 
crucial first step, but we should not lose sight 
of  the  end  goal:  developing n e w  E u r o p e a n  
platforms,  such  as  drones,  tankers  and 
satellites. Furthermore in December 2011 the 
Council  actually  prioritized  11  projects:  the 
remaining areas should not be forgotten. The 
capabilities  that  will  ultimately  result  from 
these  multinational  projects  should  be 
managed in a multinational way; the European 
Council explicitly encouraged Member States 
“to  replicate”  the  flexible  yet  far-reaching 
model of European Air Transport Command 
(EATC).  
 
The pressure has to be kept up therefore. The 
knowledge  that  in  June  2015  the  European 
Council will assess performance is one way. In 
addition, as of now the EDA, the Commission 
and key governments should take the initiative 
to go around Europe and actively recruit more 
Member States for the projects that they want 
to champion.  
 
4. POOLED PROCUREMENT  
At  the  same  time  as  pursuing  projects  on 
strategic  enablers  at  the  European  level,  and 
partially  as  a  precondition  for  that,  Member 
States  should  step  up  again  pooling  and 
sharing in the various regional clusters. Only 
very  ambitious  pooling  and  sharing,  allowing 
for  the  rationalization  of  supporting  services 
and for concentration on a reduced number of 
bases,  will  enable  Member  States:  (1)  to 
maintain their current capacity for deployment, 
(2) eventually to modernize it by upgrading to 
new  platforms,  and  (3)  to  create  budgetary 
margin  of  manoeuvre  to  invest  in  the 
European projects on strategic enablers.  
 
Belgian-Dutch  naval  integration  is  the  best 
example  of  how  maximal  pooling  and  even 
specialization can be reconciled with maximal 
sovereignty  and  flexibility.  Using  the  same 
equipment,  national  platforms  manned  by 
national crews are now entirely supported by 
headquarters,  logistics,  maintenance  and 
training  that  are  either  binational  or  only 
provided  by  one  nation  for  both  forces. 
Objectively, there is no reason why the same 
model  could  not  be  immediately  applied  to 
other  capability  areas,  between  the  Benelux 
countries  as  between  the  Nordic,  Baltic, 
Visegrad and Weimar countries. The European 
Council invited the EDA “to examine ways in 
which  Member  States  can  cooperate  more 
effectively  and  efficiently  in  pooled 
procurement  projects”,  and  report  to  the 
Council by the end of 2014 already. This can 
be a great facilitator in this regard, as would 
eventual  incentives  (fiscal  and  other)  – a  4
th 
achievement.  
 
5.  CONVERGENCE  OF  DEFENCE 
PLANNING  
In some areas capability will thus be offered by 
several Member States and/or smaller clusters 
of Member States (and Member States will of 
course  participate  in  several,  partially 
overlapping,  clusters  at  once,  choosing 
partners in function of the capability areas in 
which  they  want  to  remain  active).  In o t h e r  
areas there will likely be only one large cluster, 
because  strategic  enablers  require  a  much 
bigger  critical  mass.  To  make  sure  that  this   3 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
complex puzzle in the end produces a coherent 
set  of  capabilities  at  the  level  of  all  EU 
Member States together (without each Member 
State having to be active in each area), requires 
“increased  transparency  and  information 
sharing in defence planning, allowing national 
planners  and  decision-makers  to  consider 
greater  convergence  of  capability  needs  and 
timelines”,  as  the  European  Council  rightly 
stated. Its tasking to the High Representative 
and the EDA “to put forward an appropriate 
policy framework by the end of 2014, in full 
coherence  with  existing  NATO  planning 
processes”,  is  a  crucial  5
th  achievement 
therefore.  
 
Today we have national defence planning, and 
the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) 
for  the  Alliance  as  a  whole.  Yet  in  reality, 
significant additional capability will more likely 
be generated by clusters of European countries 
than by individual nations. And when it comes 
to  operations,  because  of  the  “pivot” o f  t h e  
American  strategic  focus  to  Asia  and  the 
Pacific  it  is  more  likely  that  interventions  in 
Europe’s  broader  neighbourhood  will  be 
launched by Europeans than by NATO as a 
whole. The European Council’s tasking would 
thus precisely fill the gap in defence planning 
between the national and NATO levels: what 
is the level of ambition for the European pillar 
of NATO/the CSDP? Those collective goals 
can then be incorporated into the NDPP.  
 
The High Representative and the EDA need 
not start from scratch, but can build on the on-
going  update  of  the  Capability  Development 
Plan  (CDP),  increasing  the  degree  of 
information-sharing,  and  endowing  it  with  a 
mechanism  to  identify  and  act  upon 
opportunities for convergence. This concerns 
the already identified 11 priority projects, but 
now  is  also  the  time  to  start  a  collective 
reflection on the longer-term capability needs, 
so as to be able to launch actual development 
collectively from the start as well. Most new 
capabilities  entering  our  arsenals  today  have 
been  initiated  15  to  20  years  ago  or  more. 
Because  of  the  focus  on  the  immediate 
operational needs of our major engagement in 
Afghanistan  (and,  for  some,  Iraq)  no  major 
initiatives have been taken for a decade or so. 
If we want to avoid a gap in 20-25 years the 
time to act is now.  
 
6. STRATEGY!  
Defence  planning  leads  us  to  the  eminent 
political question. Yes, defence matters – but 
why?  The  High  Representative  in  fact 
answered that question in an unexpectedly bold 
fashion  in  her  preparatory  report.  Europe 
needs  strategic  autonomy;  which  starts  in  its 
neighbourhood, broadly defined (including the 
Sahel and the Horn, to which we would add 
the Gulf); where we have to be able to project 
power;  with  partners  if  possible  but  alone  if 
necessary;  in  order  to  protect  our  interests. 
Read together with the fact of Europe’s global 
maritime  interests,  as  evidenced  by  the 
European  Council’s  call  to  adopt  a  Maritime 
Security Strategy by June 2014 (and subsequent 
action plans), these five points constitute the 
clearest political statement yet on Europe’s role 
as a security provider. This would have been 
the logical starting point for the update of the 
CDP and any reflection on future capabilities. 
The European Council had only to copy and 
paste from Ashton’s report therefore – but alas 
it did not.  
 
All  the  more  unfortunate  because  moreover, 
like  the  tasking  on  convergence  in  defence 
planning,  these  five  points  address t h e  
European  pillar  of  NATO/the  CSDP 
simultaneously.  In  other  words,  this  really 
concerns “the state of defence in Europe”, as 
Van Rompuy originally envisaged, and not just 
the CSDP. The real question is not what are 
NATO and what are CSDP prerogatives, but 
what is Europe’s role as a security provider and 
it  consequent  military  level  of  ambition, 
regardless  of  whether  in  a  specific  crisis 
Europeans will act under the national, NATO 
or EU flag. Unfortunately, and in spite of Van 
Rompuy’s  bold  statement,  the  European 
Council  was  prepared  through  the  usual  EU 
channels and thus ended up being “just about 
the CSDP” anyway.  
 
The European Council did at least invite “the 
High Representative, in close cooperation with 
the  Commission,  to  assess  the  impact  of   4 
 
changes in the global environment, and to report 
to  the  Council  in  the  course  of  2015  on  the 
challenges  and  opportunities  arising  for  the 
Union, following consultations with the Member 
States”.  In  layman’s  terms:  please  produce  a 
strategy for Europe’s role as a security provider 
– a  6
th  achievement  which  will  allow u s  t o  
salvage  the  excellent  language  from  Ashton’s 
report.  
 
7. VISIBILITY  
To say that the “state of defence in Europe” is 
in  a  state  of  emergency  is  only  a  slight 
exaggeration.  The  European  Council  did  not 
bring us into a state of grace yet, but at least we 
are no longer in a state of denial. The issue is on 
everybody’s mind now, from the Heads of State 
and  Government  to  public  opinion  and  the 
media. Perhaps this is a good starting point for 
the  High  Representative  to  develop  a  real 
communications  strategy  on  European 
defence,  the  absence  of  which  is  a  strategic 
shortfall in its own right. Visibility was an item 
on the agenda of the European Council and 
has  certainly  been  achieved f o r  n o w   – a  7
th 
achievement  to  prove  that  this  European 
Council matters. 
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